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Abstract
We develop foundations and several constructions for security protocols that can
automatically detect, without false positives, if a secret (such as a key or password)
has been misused. Such constructions can be used, e.g., to automatically shut down
compromised services, or to automatically revoke misused secrets to minimize the
effects of compromise. Our threat model includes malicious agents, (temporarily or
permanently) compromised agents, and clones.
Previous works have studied domain-specific partial solutions to this problem. For
example, Google’s Certificate Transparency aims to provide infrastructure to detect
the misuse of a certificate authority’s signing key, logs have been used for detecting
endpoint compromise, and protocols have been proposed to detect cloned RFID/smart
cards. Contrary to these existing approaches, for which the designs are interwoven
with domain-specific considerations and which usually do not enable fully automatic
response (i.e., they need human assessment), our approach shows where automatic
action is possible. Our results unify, provide design rationales, and suggest improve-
ments for the existing domain-specific solutions.
Based on our analysis, we construct several mechanisms for the detection of misuse.
Our mechanisms enable automatic response, such as revoking keys or shutting down
services, thereby substantially limiting the impact of a compromise.
In several case studies, we show how our mechanisms can be used to substantially
increase the security guarantees of a wide range of systems, such as web logins,
payment systems, or electronic door locks. For example, we propose and formally
verify an improved version of Cloudflare’s Keyless SSL protocol that enables key
misuse detection.
1 Introduction
Most secure systems depend on secrets, and in particular cryptographic keys. Consequently, many
technical and procedural measures have been developed to prevent the leakage of secrets, such as
hardware security modules.
In reality, secrets are often compromised in various ways, either through compromising a system
holding them, implementation bugs, or cryptanalysis. This has driven the need to design mechanisms to
cope with the compromise of a secret, such as key revocation procedures, user blacklisting, or disabling
the relevant services entirely. However, independently of designing these response mechanisms, a core
question remains: how can we tell if a secret has been compromised? In other words: when are we
supposed to invoke these response mechanisms?
If an attacker compromises a secret but never makes any visible use of it, it can be hard (or even
impossible) to detect the compromise. However, in many cases, the attacker has some other goal, which
it can only perform using the secret. For example, to log into a service, to request a document, or to
trigger a specific action of the system like opening a door.
This observation is used by mechanisms like SSH’s reporting of the last login, or Gmail’s reports
of current sessions. In these settings, the service informs the user about the details of their prior
session(s). If an attacker compromises the user’s secret and logs in, the user could, in theory, detect this
manually upon their next login. In practice, users often ignore this information or cannot be expected
to remember precisely when they logged in to each service they use.
Further mechanisms that aim to facilitate detection include Certificate Transparency and its relatives,
which aim to make relevant uses of certificate authority (CA) publicly observable, thereby making
it possible to detect misuse. However, while these mechanisms typically provide a means to observe
key uses, they do not prescribe how to determine if the observed key use is honest or when to invoke
a response mechanism if it is not. In practice, a domain owner or CA must manually check for an
inappropriately issued certificate in the log, and then decide to take action—which may involve further
out-of-band communication to obtain additional details not visible in the log—before any response
mechanism is invoked.
This leads to several questions. First, is it possible to automatically determine that a secret is being
misused at the protocol layer, to avoid reliance on human input? In this case, what guarantees could
be given? In particular, we focus on detection mechanisms that do not yield false positives, which
enables a positive detection to automatically trigger a response mechanism that is appropriate for the
secret involved (such as key revocation).
Second, what are the underlying observations that make such mechanisms work? Is there any
connection between the various mechanisms that aim to detect the misuse of secrets? What are the
limits of detection, and what principles would be useful to protocol designers, in the style of [1]?
Contributions. Our main contributions are the following:
First, we provide the first general foundations for provably sound detection of the misuse of secrets,
i.e. detection that allows for automatic response. Our focus on detection as a verifiable security property
without false positives leads to solutions that can be used to automatically revoke keys, access, or
invoke other countermeasures. Our foundational approach also provides new insights into the design
choices in existing mechanisms. For example, for detecting the misuse of a Certificate Authority’s
key on the internet, our results show that both the domain owner and the CA could automatically
perform a certain kind of detection (“acausal detection”) that no other parties can perform, which leads
to suggestions for improving detection mechanisms in this domain, such as Certificate Transparency.
More generally, our results reveal which agents can perform which types of detection automatically,
clearly delineating what is possible and impossible to achieve in theory.
Second, we apply our foundational work to identify and develop several principles and generic
protocol constructions to automatically detect the misuse of secrets. We then show how such constructions
can be applied to improve the security of a variety of existing mechanisms, ranging from the
previously mentioned certificate authorities to card-based door access. For example, we propose
a simple modification to Cloudflare’s Keyless SSL protocol [10] to enable the customer to detect misuse
of the CDN’s keys, which can directly trigger revocation. We formally verify our proposals using the
TAMARIN prover. We additionally use our techniques to suggest improvements to the Common Access
Card [23], and the certificate creation procedures of CAs.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we provide an informal introduction to the idea of misuse
detection. We then, in Section 3, develop foundations and protocols for the automatic detection of the
misuse of secrets. We construct example protocols and apply these constructions to concrete application
examples in Section 4. We describe related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Foundations: an informal introduction
In this work we investigate a problem which has only been studied in limited instances so far: the
automatic detection of the misuse of secrets. In an ideal world it would be possible to indefinitely
prevent secrets from being compromised. Realistically, we cannot assume this is guaranteed, which
drives the need for mechanisms and procedures that can mitigate the damage of a compromised secret.
We observe that if an attacker silently obtains a secret but performs no visible actions based on this
information, the compromise fundamentally cannot be detected. Furthermore, if the attacker obtains
all necessary secrets to impersonate the original owner, performs actions using those secrets that are
identical to the expected behaviour of the original owner, and the original owner performs no further
actions (e.g., because they are deceased), then to all other participants the attacker’s behaviour is
indistinguishable from the original owner. In a way, the attacker would have completely taken over
the life of the original owner. Thus, informally, the only situation in which we can hope to detect the
misuse of those secrets is when the attacker deviates—or rather, is forced to deviate—from the original
owner’s behaviour or ongoing actions.
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In this work, we are interested in protocols in which participants obtain specific evidence of
deviation (that is, there are no false positives). This would allow detecting agents to immediately trigger
appropriate countermeasures, such as disabling a service, revoking keys, or blacklisting users. Thus, our
work contrasts with the field of anomaly detection, where one of the challenges is to detect behaviours
that are allowed by the specification, but unlikely to occur during normal usage; such detection is
typically plagued by false positives, and it is hard to take countermeasures as a result.
Consider the following examples of protocols which allow agents to differentiate adversary action
from action by the honest agents, which each examine a different aspect of detection that we will
return to in Section 3.
Example 1. Alice has a secret kA which she can use to authenticate messages. The adversary
compromises this secret, and sends an authenticated message which is obviously incorrect. For example,
the authenticated message might be “I compromised this secret”.
Example 1 is unlikely to occur in practice, but it is still a valid action the attacker could take so it
is important to take it into account.
Example 2. Alice and Bob have signing keys kA and kB respectively, and send each other messages
authenticated with their keys over a public channel. They each maintain a counter, and when Alice
sends a message to Bob she increments her counter, generates a new nonce nA and includes them both
in her message along with the last nonce received from Bob. Upon receiving this message Bob checks
that his last nonce matches, increments his counter, and checks that it matches the one in the message.
Similarly, when Bob sends a message to Alice, he includes a newly generated nonce nB , his counter
value, and Alice’s last nonce nA. The next message from Alice contains a new nonce n′A, nB , and an
incremented counter value, the next message from Bob a nonce n′B , n
′
A, and his counter value, etc.
Example 2 illustrates a simple case in which misuse can be detected. If an attacker gains knowledge
of kA and the current value of the counter, and injects a new message purporting to be from Alice,
then Alice’s and Bob’s value of the counter will become de-synchronised and they could detect upon
comparison that kA was misused. However, this is somewhat limited, as an attacker with knowledge of
both keys who observes a counter value could strike up conversations with Bob, then wait for Alice to
send messages. By intercepting these and returning a message to Alice which appears to be from Bob
the adversary can increment Alice’s counter until it matches, and then inject one more message to each
to resynchronize their nonces. Alice and Bob are left in a state as if the attacker were never involved.
Note that because Alice and Bob’s counter values rely only on the number of messages exchanged
and not on their content, it is impossible to determine if they agreed on all previous message content.
Thus, the attacker can resynchronize them even after they have disagreed about the messages exchanged.
Example 3. Instead of using a counter, Alice and Bob adopt a system of ‘rolling nonces with hash
chains’. When Alice sends her authenticated message to Bob, she includes a new nonce nA and a
hash chain of the previous nonces used by both parties in the conversation. Bob then checks the value
of the hash chain matches his own, and when sending a message to Alice does likewise, including a
new nonce nB and extending the hash chain with nA. The next message from Alice contains a new
nonce n′A and the hash chain extended with nB , etc.
In Example 3, suppose an attacker obtains Alice’s key kA along with the current nonce and hash
chain. The attacker can inject conversations with Bob, which necessarily extends Bob’s hash chain
with new values. If the attacker ever stops intercepting messages between the two, his session will
be detected, since the hash chain of Alice will not match and the adversary has no way to ‘rewind’
Bob’s additions to his hash chain. Indeed, even if both keys kA and kB are compromised, this example
with hash chains allows for detection if ever the attacker tries to back out of the conversation, as any
session the attacker carries out with either of them has an irreversible effect on their state.
3 Foundations and design space
In this section, we develop formal foundations and explore the design space for detecting of secret
misuse. While our contributions can be informally understood and applied in practice by skipping most
of this section and immediately moving to Section 3.5, our formal work serves the following purposes:
it enables us to precisely define the relevant concepts, explore the design space more systematically,
and will enable us later to prove that some protocols indeed achieve detection. We will use the resulting
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definitions in Section 4 to develop concrete protocols, prove their correctness, and show how to improve
existing systems.
First, in Sections 3.1 to 3.3, we build the necessary framework to formally define what it means to
soundly detect compromise, and what is necessary for detection. This leads us to classify the possible
ways misuse can be observed into three broad categories in Section 3.4 and show that they together
form a complete categorization. Finally, we combine these elements for the design space in Section 3.5.
3.1 Basic mechanisms
We introduce basic notation for a generic class of protocols and an abstract notion of detection. This
enables us to formally define what it means to (soundly) detect compromise, and what is necessary
for detection. We then isolate in Section 3.4 three different ways agents can observe key misuses:
inconsistency with a protocol specification, contradictions, and acausality. We will use these three types
of observation to guarantee detection in particular scenarios, and apply this in Section 4 to design and
improve protocols.
We assume a finite set of agents Agent as participants, each of which has some associated state,
access to a random number generator, and which can communicate only through sending and receiving
messages on a network. Agents perform actions according to a protocol. A protocol is a deterministic
algorithm to be run on a Turing machine with agent state as input, which returns an action to perform.
Such actions may include sampling the random number generator, sending or receiving messages on
the network, modifying their state, etc. We write Protocol to denote the set of all protocols.
To model adversarial activity, we assume the existence of an adversary with similar resources to
the agents, but with the additional ability to perform actions which remove messages from the network
and compromise parts of agent state. Adversary actions are provided by a deterministic algorithm,
which we call an adversary model. It runs on a Turing machine, taking adversary state as input and
outputting an action for the adversary to perform. We denote the set of all adversary models Adv.
The definition above does not allow for malicious agent activity, since all agents are assumed to
follow the protocol. We emulate malicious agents instead through the adversary model, which may
include completely compromising the state of some agents. Since agent actions are a function of
their state, and since all communication with other agents occurs through the adversary-controlled
network, this is sufficient to allow adversary emulation of an agent. This makes it easier to abstractly
distinguish potentially malicious actions from honest and correct actions in the trace, while allowing
for over-approximation of the abilities of malicious agents (since the adversary model may include
controlling the network or compromising additional agents).
Each combination of a protocol P ∈ Protocol and adversary model A ∈ Adv gives rise to a
transition system with agent states, the network as a set of messages, and the state of the adversary.
We log each action performed by agents or the adversary as events in a trace, with the requirement
that the trace contains sufficient information to reconstruct the state of the adversary and every agent
at the end of the trace. For example, an agent performing an action to sample the random number
generator would be logged as an event including the resulting value. We call a set of all possible traces
arising from some protocol and adversary model a trace set, and use Tr(P,A) to refer to the trace
set of a particular protocol P and adversary A. Note that trace sets are prefix-closed, as individual
transitions are assumed to be atomic and the participants can stop at any time.
Generally we do not care about the specific actions performed by the agents or the adversary, or
their resulting encoding in the trace, other than requiring an abstract way to refer to certain events
relevant to detection. This allows us to restrict the actions of participants as little as possible while
still having well defined communication structure. We use compromise(k) to refer to any adversary
event that compromised some data k from any agent’s state; this allows us to refer to, for example, the
subset of traces in a trace set in which a particular term is never compromised. We use send and recv
to refer to any agent event which sent (resp. received) on the network, parametrized by the message
involved. Finally, we denote detection of a compromised k by a special agent event detect(k).
The initial state of the agents includes both agent-specific data as well as any public data assumed
to be known to the adversary as well as the agent (e.g. some settings may assume a public key
infrastructure). Adversary initial state contains only this public data. Since we do not bound the
computation time of the agents or adversary, we instead assume a symbolic model of security in which
a term algebra (e.g. that of TAMARIN [19]) defines how terms may be derived.
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In order to discuss a particular subsequence of events in a trace, we define the sequence projection
operator. For a set S of trace events, the projection |S is defined as
〈〉|S = 〈〉
(〈e〉 · tr′) |S =
{
tr′|S if e 6∈ S
〈e〉 · (tr′|S) if e ∈ S.
We define the projection -S as the projection onto the complement of S, |Sc . For shorthand, we
enumerate some common projections that we will use throughout this section:
• For a set X ⊆ Agent, |X for all trace events e such that one of the agents in X is performing e,
• |c(k) for all compromise(k) events,
• and |event for all trace events e of type event.
Projection is distributive over sets of sequences, so a projection of a set of sequences is the set of each
sequence with the projection applied. We address elements of a sequence s as s1 . . . s|s| from the first
to the last element. We overload set notation for sequences and write e ∈ s for a sequence s if and
only if ∃i . si = e.
We focus on detection protocols that can automatically trigger an appropriate response when they
detect, such as key revocation, disabling services, or blacklisting users. To enable this, it is important
that there are no false positives. Formally,
Definition 4 (Soundly detecting protocol). We say a detecting protocol P ∈ Protocol is sound with
respect to an adversary model A ∈ Adv if
sound(P,A) ≡ ∀tr . tr ∈ Tr(P,A) =⇒ ∀k . (detect(k) ∈ tr =⇒ compromise(k) ∈ tr).
In this paper we do not prescribe a response mechanism for key compromise, since this is an
orthogonal area of research (and often involves side-channels or other scenario- or system-specific
resources). We instead discuss which parties can detect and when. Soundness enables any detecting
party to immediately trigger whichever response mechanism it deems appropriate.
3.2 Reasoning about agents
In order to reason about agent capabilities, we must be able to talk about their state as well as the
possible actions they can perform under particular constraints. We begin with some notation to discuss
the state of agents after a trace. Since trace events are, by definition, enough to determine how agent
state changes with each action, the state of some agents at some time along with a sequence s of events
are sufficient to determine the state of those agents after s. This is formally stated in Corollary 6.
Definition 5 (State after a trace). For a set of agents X ⊆ Agent, we introduce the notation state(tr,X)
to represent the collective state of the agents of X after a trace tr.
Corollary 6 (State convergence). Let tr and tr′ be two traces in a trace set T such that state(tr,X) =
state(tr′, X), and X ⊆ Agent. Then
∀s . tr · s ∈ T ∧ tr′ · s ∈ T =⇒ state(tr · s,X) = state(tr′ · s,X).
The state of particular agents’ after trace tr are, by necessity, some function of tr|X , since all
state changes of an agent arise from actions they perform. Notably, this requires that state(tr,X) =
state(tr′, X) if tr|X = tr′|X .
State convergence is a particularly useful property, because it implies that a subset of agents cannot
differentiate two traces in which their combined states are the same, unless they later receive a message
that is only possible in one of the two. In fact, we can lift this to prove practical limitations on when
it is possible to detect even when agents can run an arbitrary protocol between themselves. We define
protocol extensions to capture the events that could occur running a secondary protocol, without an
adversary, after a particular trace.
Definition 7 (Protocol extension). Let T = Tr(P,A) for some protocol P and adversary A. A protocol
extension performed by a set X ⊆ Agent beginning from the trace tr is the set of all sequences of
agent events s performed by agents in X such that tr · s ∈ T , and s is independent of all prior network
events. Formally,
SP (tr, T,X) ≡ {s | (tr · s) ∈ T ∧ (s|X = s) ∧
∀m, i . (si = recv(m) =⇒ ∃j < i . sj = send(m))} .
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We use SP (tr, T ) as shorthand for SP (tr, T,Agent), which is equivalent to omitting only adversary
events from the protocol extensions.
Intuitively, these protocol extensions represent what a set of agents can do by running a protocol
amongst themselves after a particular trace, in an ideal environment where no adversary interferes.
State convergence can be leveraged to show a useful property of the protocol extensions across all
possible protocols.
Lemma 8. Let T = Tr(P,A) for some protocol P and adversary A, and X ⊆ Agent a set of agents.
Then
∀tr, tr′ ∈ T . (state(tr,X) = state(tr′, X)) =⇒ SP (tr, T,X) = SP (tr′, T,X).
That is, for every protocol, any two traces tr and tr′ where state(tr,X) = state(tr′, X) have the same
X-protocol extensions.
Proof. Assume otherwise; that is, there is a trace suffix s in SP (tr, T,X) that is not in SP (tr′, T,X).
If s 6∈ SP (tr′, T,X), then by the definition of protocol extensions either s|X 6= s, or there are
recv events with no corresponding send in s, or tr′ · s 6∈ T . The first two are trivially false by
the requirement that s ∈ SP (tr, T,X), so it must be true that tr′ · s 6∈ T . We will construct tr′ · s
recursively to show that this is false.
Take the first element of s, which we will call e such that s = 〈e〉 · s′ for some sequence s′. The
set T is prefix-closed since it is generated by a protocol, and by the definition of protocol extension,
tr · s ∈ T , so tr · 〈e〉 ∈ T .
If tr′ · 〈e〉 6∈ T , then this must be because the action corresponding to the event e cannot be
performed after tr′. The event can only rely on receivable messages on the network, the output of
the random number generator, or the state of the agent, so one of these must differ between tr and
tr′. However, the antecedent requires that both the states and sent messages are identical, and the
random number generator does not depend on the prior trace, so none of these can be the case and
thus tr′ · 〈e〉 ∈ T .
By Corollary 6, state(tr · 〈e〉, X) = state(tr′ · 〈e〉, X), and because every trace is finite we are left
with a shorter s′ on which we can repeat the argument above to eventually find that tr′ · s ∈ T , a
contradiction.
Lemma 8 allows us to begin reasoning about the space of possible actions a set of agents can take.
It shows that after a trace, a set of agents performing any protocol at all amongst themselves are still
limited to some computation over their collective state.
Note there is an equivalent definition of soundness in terms of protocol extensions.
Lemma 9 (Equivalent definition of soundly detecting). For a detection protocol P ∈ Protocol and
adversary model A ∈ Adv,
sound(P,A) ⇐⇒ ∀tr, s . tr ∈ Tr(P,A) ∧ s ∈ SP (tr, T r(P,A)) =⇒
∀k . (detect(k) ∈ s =⇒ compromise(k) ∈ tr) .
Proof. (Sketch) If a protocol is sound, then detect(k) events must be preceded by a compromise(k)
event in all traces. Since compromise(k) cannot occur in the protocol extension s by definition, a
detect event in s implies a compromise event in tr.
In the other direction, let us assume that detect events in protocol extensions imply a compromise
event in the trace, but the protocol is not sound. Since it is not sound, and trace sets are prefix-closed,
there exists a trace tr′ · 〈detect(k)〉 that ends with a detect event but with no compromise event in
tr′. But then the protocol extension of tr′ also contains this detect event, a contradiction.
3.3 Observability of misuse
Whether a usage of a key is ‘correct’ in general may not be possible to determine from the limited
perspective of an agent. To detect misbehaviour, and its subsequent attribution to the misuse of a
secret, the protocol (or in a wider sense, the security mechanism) must be designed to make the misuse
observable by the agent in question. We first give two examples to provide intuition about the type of
designs that (fail to) accomplish this, before providing a more formal treatment of observable misuse
to build useful detection protocols.
Ideally, it would be possible to soundly detect any compromise by the adversary. There is however
an upper bound on how much can be detected: intuitively, there is no possible protocol for a set of
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agents to soundly detect secret misuse if that misuse had no effect on them. We formalize this below,
using the protocol extension properties discussed above.
Lemma 10 (Sound detection requires state). For a secret k, a set X of agents, and a trace tr in a
trace set T = Tr(P,A) generated by a protocol P with adversary A,
∀s, tr′ . s ∈ SP (tr, T,X) ∧ detect(k) ∈ s ∧ tr′ ∈ T ∧ (tr′|c(k) = 〈〉) ∧
state(tr,X) = state(tr′, X) =⇒ ¬sound(P,A).
That is, if a set X of agents detect the misuse of k in a trace tr ∈ Tr(P,A) when that state could
also be reached in a trace without compromise, then the protocol cannot be sound.
Proof. Assume it is possible for the agents in X to soundly detect after tr, and thus there exists a
suffix s ∈ SP (tr, T,X) where detect(k) ∈ s.
The antecedent requires a trace tr′ where
tr′ ∈ T ∧ (tr′|c(k) = 〈〉) ∧ (state(tr,X) = state(tr′, X)),
and from Lemma 8,
SP (tr, T,X) ⊆ SP (tr′, T,X).
Thus s ∈ SP (tr′, T,X). Since the agents detect in s after a trace with no compromise events, the
detection cannot be sound.
The requirement that the state of the agents could arise in a restricted trace set (in this case, traces
with no compromise of k) is a useful one, which we formalize in terms of agent state being consistent
with a trace set.
Definition 11 (State consistent with a trace set). Let T = Tr(P,A) generated by a protocol P with
adversary A. The state of some agents X ⊆ Agent after a trace tr is consistent with the trace set T
if there is at least one trace in T which leaves the agents in X in the same state as tr.
consistent(X, tr, T ) ≡ ∃tr′ ∈ T . (state(tr,X) = state(tr′, X)) .
We say that misuse of a secret k in a trace tr ∈ Tr(P,A) is unobservable by a set X of agents
when
consistent(X, tr, {t | t ∈ T ∧ t -c(k) ∈ T}).
A trace involving key misuse which leaves the agents in some state that is also reachable without
a compromise of the key limits the ability of the agents in X to detect; by Lemma 10 there is no
idealized protocol the agents of X could run to detect the misuse.
It is important to note that, while observability of secret misuse is necessary for a set of agents to
soundly detect it, it is not sufficient to guarantee that deciding whether to detect can be done tractably
(i.e. in a polynomial amount of time). For example, consider a toy protocol where an agent generates
a random value with some property and sends the output of a one-way permutation applied to that
value over the network signed with their key—detecting misuse of that key may require inverting the
permutation to check if the input value had the correct property.
3.4 Categorizing observable misuse
Lemma 10 shows that a set X ⊆ Agent must reach a collective state inconsistent with the set of all
traces without compromise of k to have a possibility of soundly detecting it. In this section we show a
categorization of different ways an inconsistent state might be reached, and prove some properties of
them which should be considered when designing or modifying a protocol to detect secret misuse.
We divide the ways of observing misuse into three categories, based on the messages received
by an agent. The first, trace-independent inconsistency refers to a received message that could not
have occurred at all without compromise. The second, an observation of contradiction, refers to the
observation of a sequence of messages which, while each individually possible, could not occur in that
sequence without compromise. Finally, an observation of acausality is when a sequence of received
messages requires action on the part of an agent in order to occur in a trace set, but has occurred
without such an action. This final type of observation requires agents to be in a position where they
would know if the action did not occur.
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3.4.1 Trace-independent inconsistency
The simplest way in which agents can determine that the current trace is inconsistent with a trace set
is by receiving a message which could not occur in any trace of that trace set. This category of misuse
event is observable ‘statelessly’ in the sense that it is inconsistent with the trace set independently of
the current trace. As such, we refer to this category of observability as trace-independent inconsistency.
We formalize it as the negation of the predicate spec, representing the ability to receive a message
in any trace within an arbitrary trace set T , where
spec(m,T ) ≡ ∃tr ∈ T . recv(m) ∈ tr.
and messages which cannot be received in a trace set are referred to as out-of-specification. The latter
are not expected to arise often. Example 1 in Section 2 illustrates this.
3.4.2 Observing contradictions
The messages in a trace are contradictory compared to a trace set if each message can occur individually
but the sequence cannot occur in any trace of the trace set. This is formalized with the predicate
contra.
Definition 12 (Contradictory messages). Given a set X ⊆ Agent, a trace tr, and a trace set T , we
say that the agents of X have received a contradictory sequence of messages when
contra(X, tr, T ) ≡ (∀m . recv(m) ∈ tr =⇒ spec(m,T )) ∧ (∀tr′ ∈ T . tr|X |recv 6= tr′|X |recv).
Example 2 in Section 2 can detect because of the observability of contradictory messages. In that
example, each message received from the other party is expected to include the next counter value, so
an agent could detect if they saw two messages with the same counter value even if each message
would be valid on its own.
A stronger example making use of contradictory messages to detect is found in transparency
overlays like Certificate Transparency, where the public log produces signed tree heads for the auditors.
These signed tree heads are expected to be mutually consistent, and misuse of the log server’s key
could be detected in principle by receiving a tree head which is not consistent with another tree head
produced with the key.
Both trace-independent inconsistency and contradictory messages allow an agent to store evidence
of key misuse, since the message or messages involved are enough to detect irrespective of the receiving
agent’s state. This allows, in transparency overlays for example, the misuse of a log server’s key to be
proven to third parties by showing them two inconsistent signed tree heads.
3.4.3 Observing acausality
While the previous two categories reason about received messages, it is also possible to detect based
on agent state directly by counterfactual reasoning. For example, an agent storing all prior uses of
their key can identify misuse of their key if they see a usage that is not in their state. This extends in
more complex ways: transparency overlays are based on the ability of an identity or domain owner to
notice an entry in the log that they did not request, on the assumption that only the owner should be
initiating the process to add an entry to the log.
We define a notion of causal precedence, where an agent causally preceding the messages of a
trace has some guarantee that they are required every time some sequence of messages occurs in the
trace set.
Definition 13 (Causal precedence). A set of agents X causally precedes the messages of a trace tr in
a trace set T if there is some trace in which those messages can be received, and in every such trace
some agent in X must have participated by sending at least one message. Formally,
causal(X, tr, T ) ≡ (∃tr′ ∈ T . tr|X |recv = tr′|X |recv) ∧(∀tr′ ∈ T . tr|X |recv = tr′|X |recv =⇒ tr′|X |send 6= 〈〉).
Since the agents of X would expect to have performed some action before or during a sequence of
messages, their state may become inconsistent with an uncompromised trace. In fact, the only way the
agents’ states can become inconsistent with a trace set upon receiving an otherwise valid series of
messages is if they causally precede those messages in that trace set. We formalize this in Lemma 14.
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Example 3 in Section 2 makes use of causal precedence to observe misuse, as Alice would expect
to have generated the nonce received in Bob’s message if the adversary has compromised neither
key. Note that in this case, Alice does not causally precede Bob’s message if either of their keys has
been compromised, so it is not possible for Alice to determine which key has been compromised
if this occurs—that is, Alice’s state will not be inconsistent with either trace set where one key is
compromised, just inconsistent with traces where neither key is compromised.
Lemma 14 (Complete categorization). For a secret k, a set X ⊆ Agent, and a trace set T = Tr(P,A),
let tr ∈ T and Tuc = {t | t ∈ T ∧ t -c(k) ∈ T}. If tr leaves the agents of X in a state inconsistent
with any uncompromised trace, then compared to the trace set Tuc:
i) a message in tr is not possible in any trace, or
ii) the message sequence observed in tr is contradictory, or
iii) X causally precedes the messages observed in tr.
Formally,
¬consistent(X, tr, Tuc) =⇒
(∃m . recv(m) ∈ tr ∧ ¬spec(m,Tuc)) ∨
contra(X, tr, Tuc) ∨ causal(X, tr, Tuc).
Proof. Assume this is not true, so that X is not causal, nor contains contradictory messages, nor are
any of the messages impossible in an uncompromised trace. From this, we will reach a contradiction
by constructing a trace in Tuc which leaves the agents of X in the same state as tr.
If the antecedent is false, then expanding the definitions,(∀recv(m) ∈ tr . spec(m,Tuc)) ∧ (∃tr′ ∈ Tuc . tr|X |recv = tr′|X |recv) ∧(∃tr′ ∈ Tuc . tr|X |recv = tr′|X |recv ∧ tr′|X |send = 〈〉).
Thus, there exists a trace tr′ ∈ Tuc where tr|X |recv = tr′|X |recv and tr′|X |send = 〈〉. Since this trace
is in Tuc we can also conclude that tr′ -X ∈ Tuc, as the only way the agents of X can influence the
actions of the other agents or the adversary is through send events.
We can now concatenate all events of tr|X onto this trace. Each event is either local or relies on
the state of the network; by the assumption above tr′ must contain the same receive events, so either
the network already contains or the adversary can already generate all of these messages after the trace
tr′ -X . Thus, tr′ -X · tr|X ∈ Tuc, and given that all the state transitions of X are identical to those in
tr, state(tr′ -X · tr|X , X) = state(tr,X).
Note that in most cases, detection would only be feasible when the set of agents X that observes
the misuse is a singleton. Nonetheless, knowing that some set of agents is able to observe misuse can
be valuable for guiding protocol design, as it may be possible to modify the protocol so that these
agents can communicate enough to detect, or to narrow the number of agents required to observe
misuse. Alternatively, for some systems it may be practical to assume some out-of-band channel for
communication between the observing agents, and perform detection that way.
As an example, if a protocol requires at least one agent from a set to make a request before a
particular token is produced, then that set of agents collectively causally precedes the production of
that token but none of the agents individually do. However, if the protocol can be modified such that
the token produced depends on which agent requested it, then each agent individually could causally
precede the production of their tokens. We distill lessons like these into general design principles and
constructions below.
3.5 Design space
We now revisit our observations to identify the possible observation mechanisms and summarize design
principles.
3.5.1 Main detection mechanisms
We identify three main mechanisms by which secret misuse can become observable. Ultimately, all
of them rely on the observations that agents make through their interactions with the network. The
difference in approaches mainly depends on the extent to which they take this information and their
own actions into account.
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Recall that state inconsistency is necessary but not sufficient for detection. Nonetheless, the
categorization of observability conditions provides a categorization of the types of detection that can
be designed into a detecting protocol.
1) Trace-independent observability of any single message in the trace set, which requires no
knowledge of the prior trace events.
2) Contradicting observations when a sequence of observed messages cannot occur in a single
honest trace. This requires enough knowledge of prior observed messages to determine if new
observations contradict.
3) Acausal observations when the observed messages contradict the agents’ knowledge of their own
activity. This is only possible for agents who causally precede the observed message sequence in
honest traces, and it requires enough knowledge of past agent actions as well as prior observed
messages to determine whether the agent caused the observed messages.
All agents can detect based
on trace-independent observability
Stateful agents can detect
based on inconsistent observations
Stateful agents that causally
precede the use of a secret can
detect based on acausal observations
Figure 1. Venn Diagram of the type of agents and the detection mechanisms that they might be able to use. Only stateful agents
that causally precede the use of a secret can use all three types.
3.5.2 Design principles
The combination of the three types of detection and the concrete detection mechanisms leads to a
number of design principles for detecting the misuse of secrets.
We note that for any given application, there may be practical and security considerations that
affect whether and how the principles can be applied. For example, the wish to maintain confidentiality
and unlinkability of messages may limit the application of Principle 3. Restrictions on message size,
communication complexity, and storage size may limit the applicability of any of the principles. This
directly results in a trade-off between such restrictions and the ability to detect the misuse of secrets.
• Principle 1: Protocol messages should be tightly coupled to prior messages. This helps maximise
the possibility of any misuse detection, and prevents an adversary from ‘resychronizing’ agents
after misusing keys (e.g. the attack described in Example 2). Stateless protocols necessarily violate
this principle.
• Principle 2: Include unique and unpredictable values in messages. This helps to establishing
contradicting observations, and ensure an adversary cannot correctly predict what an agent will do
next. If values are not unique, then agents could get identical observations from messages sent at
different points, making them indistinguishable. If an adversary could predict the next exchange,
they could potentially carry it out in advance with one of the participants and then take their
place in the real exchange without leaving any evidence.
• Principle 3: Maximize the spread of data that other parties might find contradictory or acausal.
Detection requires observations, so it is important to increase the opportunities for that to happen.
Ideally, some observations could be broadcast to all participants (e.g., used when disseminating
transactions in Bitcoin-like systems [12,15,21] to detect double spending), but for many applications
this is not feasible. This motivates the need for compromise solutions such as a gossip protocol
(e.g., [9]).
• Principle 4: Identify which agents causally precede important messages, and ensure they can
observe those messages. Agents who causally precede a sequence of messages can detect more
than agents who can only detect by observing contradictions. It is therefore worthwhile to ensure
that the protocol enables the detection of acausal observations as much as possible.
For example, in the PKI setting, the agents with causal precedence are the domain owner and
the CA, since a certificate for domain signed with a CA’s key should only exist after it has
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been requested by the domain and then signed by that CA. If such a certificate occurs without
the request, or without the CA signing it, then the key must have been misused. This principle
is implicitly used in systems like Certificate Transparency [17] and other systems based on
transparency overlays, which we will return to in Section 4.3.
Some minor aspects of the above principles are similar to principles from earlier work [1], but there
are crucial differences. Principle 1 explicitly requires state, which leads to a trade-off between security
guarantees and keeping track of state. Principle 2’s unique values have been suggested before, but not
all messages need to have unpredictable values for other security properties. This unpredictability is
specifically useful for detection. Principle 3, which suggests spreading data, improves detectability
at a clear cost in terms of transmissions, which would be avoided by previously proposed principles
(except perhaps accountability). To the best of our knowledge, Principle 4 is entirely derived from our
detection-based observations, though it is implicitly used in some systems.
4 Applications
The design principles discussed in Section 3.5 are general and can be used to improve existing systems
in practice. In this section, we illustrate this by applying the techniques from Sections 3.4 and 3.5 to
construct example protocols, and use them as guides to modify existing real-world protocols, including
Keyless SSL [10], the Common Access Card (CAC)-based physical access control [23], and the
certificate creation procedures of CAs. We show how these protocols can make use of misuse detection
methods to be resilient against compromise. Finally, at the end of the section, we provide a collection
of other popular systems, and briefly discuss each of them. In particular, we show how they fit into
our design principles, and how our design principles can improve some of them.
We formally verified several of our case studies with the TAMARIN prover [19], a tool for symbolic
analysis of security protocols. In its framework, properties are expressed in a fragment of first-order
logic that allows quantification over timepoints. We provide the full models in [2].
For our TAMARIN models, we consider an arbitrary (unbounded) number of agents and sessions.
We only restrict the models in the sense that each agent executes sequentially. More precisely, an
agent doesn’t run two sessions concurrently with the same peer. In all other respects our models are as
accurate as possible within the symbolic setting.
To help TAMARIN prove the properties, we manually formulated several invariants (referred to as
reusable lemmas in the TAMARIN framework). Once these are formulated, TAMARIN automatically
proves the invariants and uses them to prove the desired properties, i.e., no interaction is required.
4.1 Counting precedence and Keyless SSL
To illustrate the application of the principles, we imagine a simple protocol in which one agent
increments a counter each time the other provides a fresh signature, similar to example 2. In this
setting, the causal structure is very clear: the counter value is increased at most once for each signing
key use.
The counter protocol is based on this idea, shown in Figure 2. Note that throughout this section, a
message m signed by using signing key sk is presented as {|m |}sk, which includes both the signature
on m and the plaintext message m.
The counter protocol demands that R increase their counter once for each unique signed message by
I , where uniqueness is ensured by requiring I to include a nonce generated by R during the previous
session. As such, I can determine whether they caused each increment of R’s counter by comparing
their counter state with the counter returned by R. Hence, the counter and nonce implement a minimal
form of Principle 1 and 2: while the values should be unique, the dependency on previous messages
is still relatively loose. From Principle 4 we find that I causally precedes the signed messages and
can therefore perform causal detection.
Despite its simplicity, the counter protocol has a number of desirable detection properties, which
we formally verified with Tamarin.
1) Soundness if sk(R) cannot be compromised: detection events of a term imply it was compromised,
for all traces in T = Tr(P,A) where A cannot compromise sk(R).
∀t ∈ T, i, k . ti = detect(k) =⇒ (∃j < i . tj = compromise(k)) .
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I R
- create a nonce nii
- m1 := {| I,R, nii, nri−1 |}sk(I)
m1
- verify m1 and I, R, nri−1
- generate a nonce nri
- cri := cri−1 + 1
- m2 := {|R, I, nri, nii, cri |}sk(R)
session(Resp, I, 〈nri, nii, cri〉)
m2
- verify m2 and R, I, nii
- detect (sk(I)) if cri 6= cri−1 + 1
session(Init, R, 〈nri, nii, cri〉)
Figure 2. The counter protocol. The inclusion of nri−1 in m1 could instead be provided as a nonce in an additional message
m0 = {|R, I, nri |}sk(R), as in the Keyless SSL example in Figure 3
Note that if sk(R) can be compromised, detect(sk(I)) instead implies that sk(I) or sk(R) is
compromised, which may still be a useful property.
2) Detection guarantee for past sessions if sk(R) cannot be compromised: In the trace set T =
Tr(P,A) where A cannot compromise sk(R), if there is a matching session in which I did not
detect, then every session before matched.
∀t ∈ T, I,R, i1 < i2 < i3, data1, data2 .
ti1 = session(Init, R, data1) ∧ ti2 = session(Resp, I, data2) ∧
ti3 = session(Init, R, data2) ∧ ¬(∃k, i1 < j < i3 . tj = detect(k))
=⇒ (∃j < i1 . tj = session(Resp, I, data1)) .
Keyless SSL. Keyless SSL was designed by CloudFlare to allow the provision of CDN services
to web services that cannot or do not want to cede their certificates’ private keys to CloudFlare [10].
In Keyless SSL, CloudFlare’s servers interact with a customer-provided key server, which decrypts
pre-master secrets as needed for CloudFlare to carry out key exchanges as if they knew the customer’s
private key.
In practice, this means that a large number of different private keys are each sufficient to use the
customer’s key server as an oracle, with much greater control over key issuance and revocation than in
a typical TLS environment. This makes detection of key misuse especially valuable.
We consider the TLS DHE carried out between a CDN server C (the initiator), and a web service
owner W . C and W each hold secret keys sk(C) and sk(W ), respectively. They also have some means
to validate each other’s public keys–typically, pk(W ) would be provided through some authenticated
side channel while pk(C) is signed by a CDN-specific CA known to W . In this setting, we wish to
provide some security guarantee against an attacker who obtains sk(C) and all state information (i.e.
nonces) of C generated in any session. The protocol currently violates Principle 1, as it is essentially
stateless.
The goal of our protocol modification is to detect the compromise of sk(C), and we apply Principle
1,2, and 4 to achieve this. In the first session, the counter begins at some known value, say ‘0’. In the
ith session, when C is establishing a shared secret with W , C begins a mutually-authenticated TLS
exchange by creating a new nonce nci and sending the ClientHello message to W . Upon receiving
this message, W generates its own nonce nwi and replies to C with, among many other things, a
signature on nci and nwi in m2. Note that the exchange so far is unmodified from the standard TLS
mutually-authenticated DHE.
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C W
nci, . . .
. . . , {|nci, nwi, . . . |}sk(W )
- verify signature and nci
- cci := cci−1 + 1
- derive kci, kwi from DH parameters
- m3 :=
(
. . . , {| cci,H(m1,m2), . . . |}sk(C)
)
m3
- verify m3
- detect if cci 6= cci−1 + 1
- derive kci, kwi from DH parameters
- m4 := . . . , MACkwi(H(m1,m2,m3), . . . )
m4
- verify m4
Figure 3. An example of the additions to the i-th session of the TLS mutually-authenticated key exchange in Keyless SSL. For
clarity, we omit terms in the messages that are not relevant. Our modifications are highlighted in bold blue.
Upon verifying m2, C is certain that sk(W ) is being actively used in the current session, and
so increments its counter cci. This counter value is then included in m3. This is the only modified
message of the protocol.
If cci does not match what W expects but the hash and signature are valid, a detection event will
be raised at which point W can immediately revoke C’s key to limit the potential damage of the
compromise; W can later contact C through an out-of-band channel to begin remediation and attempt
to discover the cause.
Our modified Keyless SSL protocol, shown in Figure 3, satisfies equivalent detection properties to
the counter protocol, namely, both soundness and a detection guarantee when W is uncompromised.
In [2] we provide symbolic verification, as well as an alternative protocol which allows C to detect
instead of W . The assumption that W is uncompromised is reasonable considering W ’s role as a
signing oracle. If W were compromised as well, then it is possible for the adversary to avoid detection
by playing to role of W to resynchronize C. As discussed, this could be remedied by requiring W
to provide a signed fresh token to be returned by C in the next session, however this requires an
additional signing operation and provides benefit only when W might also be compromised.
Practical implications. The implementation of our modified protocol allows the CDN’s
customers to have assurance that either they have not been used to sign requests for an adversary
that has gained access to a valid CDN server key, or if they were then the misuse of the key will be
detected in short order. Furthermore, customers can immediately revoke to limit their risk, without
requiring other parties to act. The proposed protocol requires very little modification and minimal
storage requirements: a single counter value for each CDN server.
4.2 Commitment and the Common Access Card
Principles 1 and 4 suggest that the message sequences in a protocol are tightly coupled. This can be
achieved, e.g., by having each session contain a pre-commitment to some aspect of the next session,
ideally with a commitment that can only be fulfilled with knowledge of the agent’s state (to limit the
risk of compromised state).
We show an example of such a construction in Figure 4, with an example of a commitment protocol,
and an application in a high-security environment where the detection of cloning is valuable. R generates
an asymmetric key pair and presents I with a fresh commitment constructed by signing session data
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I R
- create a nonce ni
- m1 := {| I, R, ni, ci−1 |}sk(I)
m1
- verify m1 and ci−1
- generate a new keypair (ski, pki)
- ci := {| ′Commit′, R, I, ni |}ski
- ncci := {|ni, ci−1, ci |}ski−1
- m2 := {|R, I, pki−1, ci, ncci |}sk(R)
session(Resp, I, 〈ni, ci−1, pki−1, ci〉)
m2
- verify m2
- verify ncci using pki−1
- detect (sk(R)) if pki−1 doesn’t verify ci−1
session(Init, R, 〈ni, ci−1, pki−1, ci〉)
Figure 4. A commitment protocol.
with the secret key, as well as the secret key used for the previous commitment to ensure continuity.
In the session following, R provides the public key that allows I to verify that the commitment is
correct based on previous session data. R never reveals the commitment key, and hence the adversary
can’t authenticate their own session data even if they trick R into revealing an arbitrary number of
commitments and proofs.
This commitment protocol has a number of desirable properties, which we also formally verified
using TAMARIN. We include the model of this protocol in [2].
1) Soundness: A detection event implies compromise.
∀t ∈ T, i, k . ti = detect(k) =⇒ (∃j < i . tj = compromise(k)) .
2) Detection guarantee against key compromise: Against an adversary compromising both sk(I) and
sk(R), when I completes a session with R and some data, then either R also completed with
that data or I detected they did not.
∀t ∈ T, I,R, i, data . ti = session(Init, R, data) ∧ ¬(∃j < i . tj = detect(sk(R)))
=⇒ ∃j < i . tj = session(Resp, I, data).
3) Detection guarantee after an uncompromised session: Against an adversary who can reveal all
agent state, if there was a previous correct session and the adversary has not revealed R’s state
since that session, then any session I completes with R will also be correct or I will detect.
∀t ∈ T, I,R, j1 < i1 < i2, data1, data2 .
ti1 = session(Init, R, data1) ∧ tj1 = session(Resp, I, data1) ∧
ti2 = session(Init, R, data2) ∧ ¬
(∃s, i1 < c . tc = compromise(s))
=⇒ (∃j1 < j2 < i2 . tj2 = session(Resp, I, data2))⊕
(∃d < i2 . td = detect(sk(R))).
Common Access Card. The Common Access Card (CAC) is the standard identification card for
United States Defense personnel. The CAC has been used as an authentication token for security network
systems and also for physical access to sensitive areas [7]. It supports asymmetric key cryptography
and has writable memory. The CAC provides a useful example of a high-security domain where it is
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I R
- create a nonce nii
- m1 := {| I,R, nii, ci−1 |}sk(I)
m1
- verify m1
- verify cri−1
- generate nri, and a new keypair (ski, pki)
- ci := {|R, I, nii |}ski
- ncci := {|nii, ci−1, ci |}ski−1
- m2 := {|R, I, nri, nii,pki−1, ci, ncci |}sk(R)
m2
- verify m2
- verify ncci
- detect (sk(R)) if pki−1 doesn’t verify ci−1
Figure 5. The i-th session of the modified ISO-IEC 9798-3-3 standard protocol. Modifications are highlighted in bold blue.
valuable both to detect if a cloned card has previously been used, as well as ‘heal’ compromise so that
any clone becomes useless unless used immediately. To show an implementation, we exhibit a modified
ISO-IEC 9798-3-3 protocol (Figure 5) in the scenario of the CAC physical access control. Here, the
initiator I is a card reader which is connected to a back-end server, and the responder R is the CAC.
In our modified protocol, each CAC stores a unique commitment cr created by the back-end server.
In the i-th session, when a reader detects a CAC, the reader communicates with the back-end server,
which generates a message m1 signed with the server’s private key sk(I) containing the identities of
the server and card, a fresh nonce ni, and the previous commitment provided by the card cri−1. The
reader forwards this to the card.
The card verifies the signature, and that the provided cri−1 agrees with its local memory. If
these verifications succeed, the CAC generates a new nonce nri and a pair (ski, pki) of signing and
verification keys. The CAC creates a new commitment cri using ski, signs cri again using ski−1, and
uses its long-term key sk(R) to create a signed message m2 from the identities (R, I), the two nonces
(nr, ni), the signed cri, and the public key that verifies the previous commitment cri−1. The CAC
then sends this message to the reader to be forwarded back to the server. The server can check that
the message contents are correct, and then verifies the signatures of the commitments cri−1 and cri
against the provided proof pki−1, raising a detection alert if this validation fails; if it succeeds, the
back-end server updates its memory. The CAC also updates the old values in their memory with the
new ones. After both the server and the CAC have updated their local memory, either the door will
release or a signal will be displayed to security guards to grant access to the facility. If any of the
verification in the protocol fails, then an alarm of detection raises.
In this scenario, the modified protocol provides both detection of acausal action and of contradicting
commitments, even if the attacker can extract all information from the CAC. In other words, the
provided security guarantee is that when an attacker has a cloned copy of a CAC at time t, and used
the cloned card at time t′, then if the original card has been used in the time interval between t and t′,
the cloning of the card will be detected. If the original card is not used in the time interval between t
and t′, then the attacker can use the card to get access, but the cloning attack will be detected as soon
as the original card is used again.
The modified ISO-IEC-9798-3-3 protocol achieves equivalent detection properties to the commitment
protocol. These have been formally verified using TAMARIN, and the model of this protocol is included
in [2].
Note that while this protocol requires three signing operations on the part of the card, two of these
are by temporary commitment keys which only need to remain secure until the next authentication. As
such, a weaker and faster signature computation could be used for these to reduce the computation
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required by the card.
Practical implications. The CAC is used in high-security applications where an adversary
may have high incentive to attempt card cloning, especially since cloned cards may remain a valuable
strategic asset for some time. We show with a modified standard protocol that it is possible for a
smartcard authentication protocol to not only swiftly detect and revoke cloned cards, but also invalidate
any existing clones every time a card authenticates. This is done in such a way that an attempt to use
an earlier clone results in immediate detection and revocation of privilege before the card successfully
authenticates. Furthermore, this is possible even with the key of the reader compromised, and messages
between the card and the reader intercepted.
4.3 Improving detection in transparency overlays
Transparency overlays and related public log-based systems [3, 4, 8, 17, 24, 25] are designed to make
participants’ behaviour public through the use of a third-party log, enabling misuse detection on the
basis of acausal observations. To avoid having to trust the log maintainer, transparency overlays set up
the log structure so that the maintainer must be able to prove that any two authenticated log states
are consistent with each other. This allows a compromised log to be detected through observation of
contradictory log states, and this misuse can be proven to other participants. Whereas the mechanisms
from previous sections did not make much use of Principle 3 to more widely distribute information,
this is in fact one of the core principles underlying transparency overlays.
Participants examine log entries and detect if it contains entries they know it should not. For
example, detection of a misissued certificate in Certificate Transparency may be done by domain
owners checking the log and discovering a log entry for a certificate that they did not request, conform
Principle 4. As discussed in Section 3.4, this cannot be done by any party that would not necessarily
causally precede that certificate’s issuance, nor can any misuse be proven to other parties. The detecting
party can revoke the certificate as invalid, but there is no evidence that the CA’s key has been misused
to produce it. In practice, it is assumed that misuse of the CA’s key would instead be determined
manually based on multiple independent—or suspicious enough—certificates requiring revocation.
Though transparency overlays make use of contradicting observations to detect misuse of a log
server’s key, they rely entirely on acausal observations to detect misuse of a secret belonging to
any of the parties committing to the log. From Section 3.4, we know that if a submitting party was
compromised and their secrets were misused to authenticate (valid) submissions to the log, the only
way for the participants to detect this misuse (without causal precedence) is through observing entries
that are contradictory. Currently, however, applications like CT have no standard way that two otherwise
valid entries in the log can contradict each other.
Based on our design Principles 1 and 2, we propose that CT-like transparency applications can be
extended to allow dependencies between submissions from the same source, adding a further line of
defense to transparency overlays and improving attribution when misuse is detected. Taking Certificate
Transparency as a canonical example, we propose to add into each certificate a value dependent on
previous certificate submissions. For example, the value could be the number of certificates n, indicating
that this is the n-th certificate authenticated by that CA, starting at 0; or it could be the hash of
certificate n− 1.
Contradiction testing. With an addition that allows log commitments to contradict each other,
a log server can determine whether the CA knew about the previous commitment authenticated by
them, or whether it might have been committed without their knowledge.
When contradictory certificates are submitted to a log server, the log server can swiftly notify the
CA that either its key has been compromised or its system has not updated with issued certificates.
On the other hand, if all certificates in the log are consistent with each other, then a domain owner
discovering a misissued certificate for its domain in the log knows that the CA’s own system must
have been updating their state when the certificate was issued–an indication that the CA should have
some record of issuing that certificate.
Implementation considerations. Our proposed additions (as applied to CT) make the CAs
stateful in their creation of certificates, though with negligible overhead introduced. Importantly, the
state kept by the CA depends only on local operations, and not on any feedback from log servers, so
no latency is introduced into the process of issuing certificates. If all new certificate submissions to the
log in Certificate Transparency were required to include this information, it would immediately benefit
detection of CA key compromise.
This proposal is only one example of an addition which would force contradictions between log
submissions from the same submitter in a transparency overlay. More elaborate constructions like
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the consistency proofs used by log servers could be leveraged to make submissions to a log from a
misused key contradict a larger set of prior entries, for additional redundancy or for tying together
multiple independent logs. In other transparency overlay applications, the commitment protocol shown
in Section 4.2 could be used to ensure that future log submissions come from the same party that
generated the pre-commitment in the prior entry.
4.4 Analysing other system designs
As mentioned and illustrated previously, our design principles are general and can be used to improve
existing systems in practice. Here, we collect existing work that already conforms in part with the
foundations and principles discussed in this paper. We show how existing systems fit into our design
principles, and how they can be further improved by applying our work where relevant.
RFID tag cloning detection. Mechanisms [5, 18, 26, 27] for detecting cloned RFID tags in the
supply chain have been widely studied. In [27], the RFID readers write random values to RFID tags as
they pass through the supply chain so that the tag accumulates a sequence of random values. Cloned
tags are then detected by observing contradicting sequences for the same tag identity.
This design follows both Principle 1 and Principle 2. The tags are written with random values,
and the sequence of values grows longer each time a reader is passed, making it very likely that a
cloned tag will exit the supply chain with a different sequence written to it than the original.
More complex solutions could give stronger guarantees, but the resource constraints of RFID tags
make it difficult to suggest further improvement.
The Double Ratchet Algorithm. The Double Ratchet algorithm [20] is designed for messaging
systems to prevent replay, reordering or deletion of messages while encrypting with forward-secrecy
in an asynchronous setting. Every message sent and received is encrypted with a new ephemeral
symmetric key generated from two interlocking key ratchets, one of which is iterated with each message
sent and the other when a message is received. A compromised message key will not help an attacker
decrypt messages exchanged in previous sessions, and an adversary making use of a compromised
message key causes the newly derived key to differ between the communicating agents.
The design of the double ratchet derives new keys each message, but this is still vulnerable to
a persistent MITM attacker who was able to compromise both keys at some prior time. This could
potentially be remedied by applying Principle 3 (for example, through the use of the second concrete
mechanism we describe). This would allow communicating agents to confirm that they agree on the
keys being used, though at the cost of some privacy; care would have to be taken to anonymize log
entries, etc.
Key-evolving cryptosystems. Key-evolving cryptosystems (e.g. [6, 13, 14]) were proposed to
mitigate damage from compromised secret keys, through the use of periodic key refreshment. In the
symmetric setting, a sender and a receiver share an initial long-term secret from which they derive a
set of keys valid for a certain (application-specific) time period. In the asymmetric setting, one party
holds only the public part of another party’s private key, and updates it when they see the use of a
new private key without further communication.
Though key-evolving cryptosystems have desirable properties, they could be improved through an
application of our design principles. For example, by ensuring that key changes cannot be reset to any
previous key (Principle 1) through some derivation process that relies on the prior keys.
TPM authentication protocol. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [22] is a chip designed
to allow platforms to provide better security guarantees by securing cryptographic keys in its shielded
memory. The authorisation protocols use ‘rolling nonces’ to prevent replay attacks: in each new session,
the nonces generated in the previous session will be included in the authenticating MAC.
The use of unique nonces follows our design Principle 2, though an adversary who could inject
messages would not be prevented from making use of the TPM and then injecting a message to
resynchronize the nonces between the client and TPM. This could be prevented through the application
of Principle 1, by deriving future nonces from past sessions so that an adversary cannot resynchronize
them.
5 Related work
We present related work on security guarantees after key compromise, and on protocols with account-
ability and verifiability.
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Post-compromise security. In [11], Cohn-Gordon et al. introduce post-compromise security:
security guarantees for communication after a party’s long-term keys are compromised. This is
accomplished using dynamic secrets, similarly to the commitment protocol above (though the secrets
in the commitment protocol are used only for authentication).
Post-compromise security as described differs from detection in what is done after attempting to
establish a ‘correct’ session fails. If a guarantee of security is the only objective, then it makes sense
to simply not allow a session that uses an incorrect key even if the long-term key is correct; doing so,
however, discards information that may be sufficient to determine the compromise of a long-term key.
Detection and post-compromise security are therefore–while conceptually similar–orthogonal in nature
and can be realized independently.
Accountability and verifiability. Ku¨sters, Truderung, and Vogt have proposed definitions of
accountability and verifiability [16] which aim to be widely applicable. The proposed definitions share
some similar intuition with ours, i.e., they aim to discover if something went wrong. A conceptual
difference is that they focus on misbehaving parties (for example, election authorities that are expected
to behave in a certain way, but might not do so). In contrast, we focus on compromised parties, whose
key material is in the possession of both the party and the adversary.
6 Conclusions
We have described and explored designs for protocols that detect when an adversary misuses an agent’s
secrets. Our design principles and constructions directly led to suggesting improvements for many
deployed systems, enabling them to automatically detect the misuse of secrets. We have given example
protocols and applications, described them systematically and verified their properties in the TAMARIN
prover.
Concretely, our suggested improvements of existing systems such as CA’s, the Common Access
Card, or Cloudflare’s Keyless SSL can significantly reduce the impact of a compromise, since they can
be used to immediately revoke keys or shut down the related service.
There are some limitations to the proposed approaches. First, while our mechanisms are not
applicable to all scenarios (e. g., because keeping synchronised state can be expensive or problematic
in some use cases), it is clear that there are many applications whose security can be significantly
improved by introducing these detection mechanisms. We therefore expect our mechanisms to find
their way into many applications in the near future.
Acknowledgments. Benedikt Schmidt suggested the Keyless SSL case study as an application of our
ideas in a discussion in 2014. We didn’t anticipate it would become so topical.
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